谦之名家讲坛预告｜Nicolas de Warren：时间追寻中的主体性许诺：胡塞尔的现象学伦理学

讲座题目：

The Promise of Subjectivity in the Pursuit of Time: Husserl's Phenomenological Ethics

时间追寻中的主体性许诺：胡塞尔的现象学伦理学

时间：

2025年4月21日（星期一）16:00 

地点：

锡昌堂515

主讲人：

Nicolas de Warren 宾州州立大学哲学系教授 

主持人：

郑辟瑞 中山大学哲学系 教授

评论人：

王知飞 中山大学哲学系 博士后

主讲人简介

       Prof. Nicolas de Warren studied in Paris, Heidelberg, and Boston, and obtained his PhD at Boston University. He has published four books: Husserl and the Promise of Time (2010), A Momentary Breathlessness in the Sadness of Time (2018), Original Forgiveness (2020), and German Philosophy and the First World War (2023). He is currently working on two book projects: a phenomenology of the afterlife that examines different senses in which, whether individually, collectively, or historically, the dead haunt the living; a study of the impact of the First World War on Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu. He is in the final stages of completing two co-authored books: The Erosion of Trust and Truthfulness in the Age of Democratic Uncertainty and We Nuclear People: Responsibility for Nuclear Waste in the Vastness of Time. He has published widely in the areas of phenomenology, ethics, 19th and 20th century philosophy, aesthetics, political philosophy, and literature. Among his most recent published papers:“Cash Rules Everything Around Me: Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money” (2024), “‘Grand, Ungodly, God-Like Man’: On the Symptomatology of Fanaticism” (2023), “On the Many Senses of the Political in Sartre’s Writings” (2023), and “Where were you when I laid earth’s foundations? Levinas and The Book of Job” (2022). He has also edited a number of volumes, most recently: Phenomenologies of the Digital Age: The Virtual, the Fictional, the Magical (2024) and The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Europe (2021).

       尼古拉斯·德沃伦（Nicolas de Warren）是宾州州立大学哲学与犹太研究教授。他曾在巴黎、海德堡和波士顿学习，并在波士顿大学获得博士学位，已出版四部著作： 《胡塞尔与时间的许诺》（2010 年）、《时间悲伤中的片刻屏息》（2018 年）、《原初宽恕》（2020 年）和《德国哲学与第一次世界大战》（2023 年）。他目前正在撰写两部著作：关于来世的现象学，研究逝者在个人、集体或历史等不同意义上对生者的纠缠；以及一项关于第一次世界大战对普鲁斯特《追寻逝去的时光》之影响的研究。他在现象学、伦理学、19 世纪与20世纪哲学、美学、政治哲学和文学等领域发表了大量论文。此外他还编辑了多部作品，其中最近的两部是：《数字时代的现象学：虚拟、虚构、魔幻》（2024 年）和《劳特利奇欧洲哲学手册》（2021 年）。

内容简介

       Husserl is almost never recognized as an original ethical thinker. From the Logical Investigations to the Crisis of the European Sciences, Husserlian phenomenology has been widely recognized for its contribution to the problems of consciousness, temporality, the lived-body, perception and knowledge, empathy, and the lifeworld. Largely overshadowed is the significance of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics – a domain of inquiry which Husserl began to develop immediately after the breakthrough of phenomenology in 1900. In a letter from the 1930s, Husserl observes that all of this phenomenological thinking, centered on epistemology, consciousness, and transcendental idealism, served the purpose of bringing him to the doorsteps of what mattered most: ethics and religion; as if Husserl kept hidden and kept on hold – until the end – what was important for him, both in life and thought. Indeed, it was as the world came to an end with the First World War, with death intruding into the intimacy of his life with the death of his youngest son at the front and collapse of European culture, that Husserl turned his attention to formulating a phenomenological ethics. Husserl's reflections on ethics only increased with intensity and urgency during the 1920s until the end of his own life in the late 1938. In this lecture, I will take Husserl’s observation seriously and argue that the problem driving Husserl’s thinking is the question: how can one achieve an (ethically) meaningful life? From this premise that the foundation for Husserl’s phenomenological thinking is ethics – a foundation that could only come into view at the end, thus adding a further element of drama to phenomenology as an infinite task – I propose to recast Husserl’s conceptions of consciousness and temporality (inner time-consciousness) into an ethical form, namely: the promise of an ethical life as the pursuit of the temporality that I myself can only become for myself — the time of my life. In this manner, the phenomenological question of time receives a primarily ethical significance, much as the phenomenological question of subjectivity.

       胡塞尔几乎从未被认为是一位原创的伦理思想家。从《逻辑研究》到《欧洲科学的危机》，胡塞尔现象学在意识、时间性、身体、感知与知识、同感以及生活世界等问题上的贡献已得到广泛认可。然而，胡塞尔现象学伦理学的重要性却常常被忽略——这一研究领域是胡塞尔在1900年现象学突破后立即着手发展的。在1930年代的一封信中胡塞尔指出，所有这些以认识论、意识和超越论观念论为中心的现象学思考，都服务于将他引至最重要之物——伦理与宗教——的门前；仿佛胡塞尔始终隐藏并搁置着——直至最后——对他而言在生命与思想中最重要的东西。事实上，正是随着第一次世界大战使世界走向终结，随着死亡侵入其生命的亲密领域（幼子在前线阵亡）以及欧洲文化的崩塌，胡塞尔将注意力转向构建一种现象学伦理学。从1920年代直至1938年末他生命终结，胡塞尔对伦理的反思愈发强烈与紧迫。在此次讲座中，我将严肃对待胡塞尔的观察，并论证驱动胡塞尔思想的核心问题是：人如何能实现一种（伦理上）有意义的生活？基于胡塞尔现象学思考的基础是伦理学——这一基础只有在最后才变得可见，因而为作为一项无限任务的现象学增添了戏剧元素——这一前提，我提议将胡塞尔的意识与时间性（内时间意识）构想重塑为一种伦理形式，即：伦理生活的许诺在于追寻唯有我自身能为我自身成为的时间性——我的生命时间。这样，现象学的时间问题就与现象学的主体性问题一样，具有原初的伦理意义。